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Introduction
It is often said that strong family networks contribute to social welfare. For instance, it is suggested that strong family networks ameliorate the potentially extremely destructive combination of high unemployment rates and weak welfare states in Southern Europe. Caspar, Garfinkel and McLanahan (1994) have shown that Italy's high rates of marriage and low rates of single motherhood prevent the gender disparities in the incidence of poverty found elsewhere, a result echoed for Spain (Fernandez-Morales and de Haro-Garcia 1998) . De la Rica and Lemieux (1994) assert that family ties are key to the workability of the Spanish labor market, which combines expensive, mandated health benefits in the formal sector with a large informal sector; married women and young, single people work disproportionately in the informal sector, gaining their health benefits through a covered worker in the family and providing the "flexibility" in the Spanish labor market.
Indeed, Francesca Bettio and Paola Villa (1998) go further, arguing that not only do family networks compensate for weak welfare states in Southern Europe, but that the family plays a large role in service provision in place of a more developed tertiary sector-both public and private.
The "Mediterranean Model" proposed by Bettio and Villa (1998) may be increasingly descriptive of the economies of the Middle East and North Africa, which are distinguished by several of it's attributes: high youth unemployment rates, low rates of female labor force participation, weak welfare states, a high reliance on family networks for social insurance andrecently-declining fertility rates (Yousef 2001 , Olmsted 2001 . It may also fit the Asian economies, also perceived as "familial economies." 1 However, a less benign characterization of strong family networks is possible. It may be that in societies where patriarchal legacies are particularly durable, neither labor markets nor welfare states offer much for women or young men, whose allegiance is demanded by the family. If income is concentrated in the hands of older, married men, women and young men may have to stay firmly attached to the family, enjoy less personal autonomy, and perhaps "pay" for their keep by providing unpaid labor to the family unit. In other words, it may be contemporary patriarchal economies that simultaneously create the package of weak welfare states, strong family networks, low female labor force participation and the concentration of unemployment among the young seen in Mediterranean economies. This is an exploratory foray to assess which economies might be considered to be particularly patriarchal, to be characterized by a concentration of income in the hands of older, married men.
Included are a theoretical context for understanding a "patriarchal economy," evidence on social welfare regimes in different countries, comparative labor market information, and the author's calculations of income concentration in eight nations, using Luxembourg Income Study microdata.
I. Theoretical Context
A leading feminist economist defined patriarchy as materially based on "men's control over women's labor power " (Hartmann 1981, p. 15) . Preceding capitalism, patriarchy was an economic system in which "men controlled the labor of women and children in the family" (Hartmann 1976, p. 138) . Now, in much of the world, the two systems of patriarchy and capitalism exist in relations of "mutual accommodation" (Hartmann, 1976, p. 139) .
Job segregation by sex…is the primary mechanism in capitalist society that maintains the superiority of men over women, because it enforces lower wages for women in the labor market. Low wages keep women dependent on men because they encourage women to marry. Married women must perform domestic chores for their husbands. Men benefit, then, from both higher wages and the domestic division of labor. This domestic division of labor, in turn, acts to weaken women's position in the labor market. Thus the hierarchical domestic division of labor is perpetuated by the labor market, and vice versa (Hartmann 1976, p. 139) . Occupational segregation by sex, then, reflects the continuing operation of a patriarchal economic system, neither necessary to nor created by the dynamics of a market economythough in the analysis of Marxist political economy, hierarchical social divisions in the labor force such as gender or race are functional for capital (e.g. Reich 1981) . It is sex segregation in the labor market that creates lower wages for women, weakening their bargaining position in the family with the result that women provide the vast preponderance of unpaid reproductive work, including childcare, eldercare, cooking, cleaning and marketing.
A weak welfare state, one that does little to socialize either the costs or the work of social reproduction born disproportionately by women, then also functions to sustain a patriarchal economic system. This is particularly true if the welfare state programs that do exist are geared primarily to the needs of men, via the provision of old age pensions or unemployment insurance, rather than mothers' allowances, subsidized childcare, public health care or income maintenance programs tied more to the exigencies of childrearing than to the potential problems of wageearners.
The particular evolution of social institutions in the context of a patriarchal economic system may reinforce the economically marginal position of women. For instance school and shop hours that are incompatible with most work schedules serve to keep low earners-frequently women-out of the labor market in order to accomplish key reproductive tasks such as childcare and shopping. Similarly the lack of part-time employment may keep people charged with reproductive tasks-women--from participating in the labor market.
Patriarchal economic systems may include "relations of domination between fathers and sons as well as between men and women (Folbre 1980, p. 5) ." Historically, in the agricultural economies of Europe and the U.S., young men were tied to their fathers' farms, effectively trading their adolescent and young adult labor for inheritance of the land. Improved land represented both the essential capital stake for setting up an independent household and the 4 specific investment of considerable labor on the part of the sons. The clear connection between the age of inheritance and the age of marriage in the historical record demonstrates the degree to which concentration of family wealth in the hands of fathers held sons as laborers in the patriarchal household (Folbre 1980, Tilly and Scott 1978) .
In short then, relations of patriarchal economic domination of women and young men have been maintained historically through the sexual division of labor and inheritance practices.
They are now sustained by women's low wages and limited job opportunities, high unemployment rates for young men, welfare states that are weak or geared primarily to male breadwinners, and the familial social systems characteristic of-but not exclusive to-the Mediterranean.
II. Comparing Welfare States
Classification of welfare states by type and level of generosity has intrigued a number of scholars, creating a substantial literature. Prominent in this field is Gosta Esping-Andersen, upon whose work this paper will rely for measures of the strength of the welfare state in different countries. Esping-Andersen (1990), created an index by which to judge the strength and type of welfare state evident in different countries, which he termed a de-commodification score.
In pre-capitalist societies, few workers were properly commodities in the sense that their survival was contingent upon the sale of their labor power. It is as markets become universal and hegemonic that the welfare of individuals comes to depend entirely on the cash nexus. Stripping society of the institutional layers that guaranteed social reproduction outside the labor contract meant that people were commodified. In turn, the introduction of modern social rights implies a loosening of the pure commodity status. De-commodification occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market (Esping Andersen 1990, pp. 21-22).
Esping-Andersen based his de-commodification score upon the generosity and availability of old age pensions, sickness benefits and unemployment insurance payments. His method yields the scores and ranking that appear in Table 1 Esping-Andersen's (1990) categorization was tremendously influential, and also much criticized. Feminists in particular found his account of the welfare state and de-commodification to be exclusively and inexplicably focused on the male experience. Esping-Andersen's implicit model citizen clearly worked for pay, unless old, sick or unemployed, and did not seem to bear any responsibility for child or eldercare.
In response to criticism, Esping-Andersen then examined the extent to which different welfare state regimes had pursued "defamilialization," a term first proposed by his critics and understood by Esping-Andersen as a course that would "unburden the household and diminish individuals' welfare dependence on kinship (Esping-Andersen 1999)." Interestingly, defamilialization reduces women's dependence upon marriage as an economic strategy for a decent livelihood, often promoting their commodification through increased participation in the labor market. As framed by Orloff (1993) , two key elements of any gender-sensitive assessment of welfare states are (1) access to paid work, for married women as well as other citizens, and (2) women's capacity to form and maintain autonomous households, so that women have viable alternatives to marriage, even-or especially-if they have children. Table 2 presents Esping-Andersen's measures of the degree to which welfare states attempt de-familialization. This analysis has prompted him to separate the "conservative" category into two: (a) Continental Europe including Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands and (b) Southern Europe, here comprised of Italy, Portugal and Spain. His aim in distinguishing Southern Europe from Continental Europe is to assess the degree to which the Mediterranean nations are more familial than others, as is often asserted. One caveat may call into question the degree to which defamilization has proceeded in the liberal regimes, at least with regard to state support for reproduction. While the United States appears to devote a much larger proportion of GDP to social spending than do Spain and Italy, in fact much of this spending occurs in the form of tax expenditures, tax reductions for families with children. To the degree that these increase with income, greater support is provided to families with higher earnings, far disproportionately those that include a male earner (Folbre 2001) . In practice, to receive this state support women must remain married.
And finally, we should note that while differences among nations appear significant, in fact none of them is spending even three percent of GDP on family services. We may be making too much of the distinctions between them.
Defamilialization analysis focused on women, assessing the degree to which the state takes responsibility for reproduction. However, unemployed young men are also dependent upon the family unless the state provides for them. For completeness, this analysis must include the extent to which welfare states are compensating for youth unemployment in different countries.
This data is important for assessing the patriarchal nature of different welfare state regimes. 
III. Comparing Labor Markets & Family Divisions of Labor
This section of the paper examines published, statistical evidence from the labor market and the family division of labor to assess the degree to which the familial economies of Southern Europe and Asia may be said to be particularly patriarchal.
The Labor Market
Access to the labor market is a crucial component of economic autonomy in a market economy. To explore the degree to which older men enjoy greater access to the labor market than do women and younger men, we examine ratios of labor force participation rates and unemployment rates. 3 Table 3 presents the ratio of women's labor force participation to that of men's, as well as the ratio of the labor force participation rate of men in their early twenties to men in their late forties and early fifties. In addition, the relative unemployment rates of men in these same age categories is included. The data on unemployment and that on labor force participation are both provided in an attempt to include the experience of young men who may not be looking for work because they believe that none is available.
In Table 3 , these ratios are organized into country groups as suggested by Esping-Andersen's categories, with the addition of some potentially "familial" Asian nations. A clear divide emerges between the familial economies of southern Europe and Asia and the other regime types represented. Women's labor force participation rates relative to those of men are clearly lowest in the "familial" European nations, followed by the Asian countries, the continental, the liberal and finally the social democratic countries, where they reach their peak at 93 percent of men's in Sweden. Cooperation and Development. 1999 . Labour Force Statistics 1977 -1997 . Paris: OECD.
Patterns are a bit more muddled for young men vis a vis older men, but it does appear that unemployment is relatively concentrated among the young in the nations deemed more familial, including those in Asia. By far the highest concentration of unemployment among the young is found in Italy, Greece and Korea. Further, it is not true that high youth unemployment is a simple function of higher overall unemployment; the nations with the highest male unemployment rates in 1997-Spain, Finland, France, Sweden and Ireland-do not show particularly high concentrations of unemployment among the young. 4 This pattern re-appears in the male labor force participation ratios, though the familial, Asian and conservative nations appear more similar than in the relative incidence of male unemployment. The liberal states are at the other extreme, with nearly comparable rates of labor force participation for young and middle-aged men. The social democracies are in the middle on this measure.
Thus far, it does appear that the "strong family" of the Mediterranean and Asia is characterized by the economic dependence of women and young men on older, married men.
Neither labor markets nor welfare states in the "familial" nations offer as much for women or young men as they do elsewhere. And economic dependence may be expected to entail reduced personal autonomy, deference to patriarchal authority, and greater obligations in the form of unpaid work.
The unpaid obligations of women to the family are clear, and obvious in the premise of a family-based social insurance system. Women are providing the bulk of the childcare, elder care, health care and other services that might otherwise be supplemented by a strong social welfare system. Table 4 presents Esping-Andersen's data on the degree to which families are providing key social services.
As shown, women's unpaid workweeks are quite high in Italy and Spain relative to other European countries, to North America or even to Japan. It's also clear that a far higher It may also be true that in the familial economies young men are expected to make significant contributions of unpaid, or poorly paid, labor in the home or in family enterprises, as was true historically on the farms of Europe and the U.S; this point requires further research.
IV. Evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study Microdata
As a first step in investigating the degree to which the labor market and welfare programs in different countries might be said to favor older married men--to demonstrate more patriarchal characteristics--Luxembourg Income Study micro-data were examined for eight different countries. These eight countries were chosen to include two representative of each national type considered by Esping-Andersen and other scholars to be familial, conservative, social democratic and liberal. Italy and Taiwan represent familial nations, France and Germany conservative ones, Norway and Denmark are social democratic, and the U.S. and Australia represent liberal economies. 5 All data are from 1994 or 1995.
The population over fifteen years of age in each country were divided into categories by age, sex and marital status. The sources of market income identifiable as accruing to a particular individual include wages, as well as public and private pensions, but not self-employment income. 6 Benefit income identifiable with an individual includes both social retirement and unemployment benefits. Though reported as household benefits, child and maternity allowances were credited to women, while military benefits were attributed to men. Other sources of income reported only at the household level were omitted.
The proportions of market and benefit income received by each group divided by the proportion of that group within each country's population are presented in Table 5 . If a group received the exact proportion of market income as it represented in the population, the number reported will be 1.00.
The working hypothesis is that the "familial" nations will demonstrate a patriarchal concentration of market and benefit income on older, married men, as compared with countries with other regimes. Market income sources include wages and public and private pensions, except for Taiwan, Norway, and Australia for which public pension data is not available and France, for which no pension data is available. Benefit income includes social retirement and unemployment benefits, as well as public child allowances, maternity benefits and veterans' benefits, to the extent these are reported by individual countries. 
Concentration of Market Income
Everywhere married men earn a disproportionate share of market income; the relative proportions are highest in Germany, the United States and Italy. Older married men fare particularly well in the U.S., where the gaps between them and other categories are quite large. Table 1 , the earnings of young Americans declined significantly over the last twenty years (Blanchflower and Freeman 2000) .
Interestingly young, married men in Italy appear to be doing exceptionally well, though it may well be that only the small minority of young Italian men who are doing well are marrying, as the age of first marriage is now quite high in Italy.
Benefit Income
Benefit income is particularly concentrated in a patriarchal pattern in the U.S. where older married men do by far the best. Older married men are particularly privileged in Italy and Germany as well, but in these nations, divorced and widowed women and men also qualify for a noticeable share of social benefits which is not true in the United States. However, divorced and widowed men of working age are the only group under 65 to obtain a greater proportion of benefits than their share in the population in the United States. All other nations show a greater level of support for divorced and widowed women of working age than does the U.S., indicating some level of state support for reproduction, or defamilialization. Norway is alone in supporting single men, presumable many of them young and unemployed, and in this way defamilializing young men.
This analysis is suffers from all the usual limitations of any international comparisons based on micro-data (Atkinson and Brandolini 2001) . Particularly problematic is the inability to further attribute income streams to particular individuals in the household. Self-employment income is omitted, and particularly important in the case of Italy. Also, as Esping-Andersen (1990) has pointed out, it is not clear whether household members perceive benefits income as accruing to women or to men in situations where benefit checks for child allowances are paid to the male head of household. While the researcher may understand such a benefit to be directed toward subsidizing reproduction-traditionally women's work-men to whom the checks are mailed may view the money as income accruing to family heads. Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997) and others have demonstrated that who the check is made out to matters for family spending patterns.
V. CONCLUSION
The evidence marshaled thus far does suggest that the familial economies of Southern Europe However, it's also clear that the familial economies are not the only ones that could be described as patriarchal. Both the United States and Germany in particular appear to concentrate market and benefit income on older, married men. In the case of the U.S., this results from a concentration of women and young men in the lower rungs of an unusually and increasingly unequal labor market and a weak welfare system whose single effective program is the insurance of retired men.
One of the most important and interesting consequences of a modern patriarchal economy may be the pressure exerted on fertility. Presumably Italy and Japan are facing the consequences of being in the vanguard of what Nancy Folbre (1994) has identified as a world-wide shift of the cost and responsibilities of children from men to women as children as economic development makes children more expensive. The United States continues to avert a birthstrike with ongoing immigration, which may be the only alternative to defamilialization, or more state support for reproduction.
